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Abstract—Within the model of social dynamics determined by collective decisions in a stochastic
environment (ViSE model), we consider the case of a homogeneous society consisting of classically
rational economic agents (or homines economici, or egoists). We present expressions for the optimal
majority threshold and the maximum expected capital increment as functions of the parameters of
the environment. An estimate of the rate of change of the optimal threshold at zero is given, which
is an absolute constant: (
√
2/pi −√pi/2)/2.
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An egoist is like someone sitting in a well since long ago.
Kozma Prutkov, “Fruits of Reflection” (1853–1854)
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model [1] in the case where the society consists
of n classically rational economic agents (homines economici [2]), who are boundedly rational egoists
(hereafter, egoists). Such an agent maximizes his/her individual utility function in every act of choice.
This is obviously the most profitable individual strategy. Cooperative and altruistic strategies within the
ViSE model have been considered in [1, 3–5].
Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a strict relative voting threshold , which means that any proposal is accepted and
implemented if and only if the proportion of the society supporting this proposal is greater than α.
Each participant (agent) is characterized by the current value of capital (which can also be interpreted
as the value of individual utility). A proposal [of the environment ] is a vector of proposed capital
increments of the participants. This concept allows to model potential innovations that are beneficial for
some agents and disadvantageous for others. As a result of the implementation of such a proposal, the
capitals of the agents of the first type increase, while the capitals of the remaining agents decrease.
The proposals are consequently put to a general vote. Each homo economicus votes for those and only
those proposals that increase his/her individual capital (utility). If a proposal is supported by a proportion
of the society exceeding the threshold α, then it is accepted (the voting procedure is “α-majority” [6–8])
and the participants’ capitals get the proposed increments. Otherwise, all capitals remain the same. The
voting threshold α will also be called majority threshold and, more precisely, acceptance threshold , since
α < 0.5 is allowed.
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The generation and adoption of proposals are repeated over and over again, whereas the subject of
study is the change of the participants’ capital as a result of this process. Does it inevitably lead to an
increase in the social welfare or can democratic decisions systematically reduce the total capital of the
society? Does the financial inequality grow? How many participants are ruined?
In accordance with the basic ViSE model, the capital increments that form the proposals of the
environment are the realizations of independent identically distributed random variables. In this pa-
per, we study the case where these variables have the normal distribution N(µ, σ) whose mathematical
expectation is µ and standard deviation is σ.
The ratio σ/µ is called the coefficient of variation of a random variable. In what follows, we need
the inverse coefficient of variation: ρ = µ/σ, which we call the adjusted or normalized mean of the
environment . If ρ > 0, then the opportunities provided by the environment are favorable on average; if
ρ < 0, then the environment is unfavorable.
An aspect of social practice that can be examined using the ViSE model is adoption by the Parliament
of various bills that are “prompted by life” (environment), i.e., by economic and/or political conjuncture.
It can be assumed that the members of Parliament, being lobbyists of certain interests and adherents of
certain beliefs, are so interested in accepting or rejecting a bill (e.g., a budget draft) that this concern-
ment is adequately expressed in terms of individual utility or capital. Of course, the adoption of any
other collective decisions can also be considered (to some extent) in terms of the ViSE model and its
modifications.
In the present paper, the following topics are studied:
– the dynamics of the participants’ capital under the stated model assumptions;
– the optimal acceptance threshold , i.e., the threshold that maximizes the total capital of the society;
– dependence of the optimal acceptance threshold on the parameter ρ = µ/σ characterizing the favora-
bility of the environment.
2. DEPENDENCE OF CAPITAL INCREMENTS ON THE NUMBER OF AGENTS AND THE
PARAMETERS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
The dependence of the average (mean, expected) one-step capital increment on the parameters of the
environment and the acceptance threshold has been studied in [9]. In particular, it was found that voting
by a simple majority (i.e., with α = 0.5) in a moderately unfavorable environment leads to a decrease of
the total capital.
Analytically, this dependence can be expressed by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. 1. In a society of n egoists, the expected one-step capital increment (d˜) of an agent is:
M(d˜) = σ
n∑
x=[αn]+1
(
ρ+ fq
(
x
pn − 1
))
b(x|n), (1)
where [y] is the integer part of y, p = F (ρ), q = 1− p = F (−ρ), f = f(ρ), b(x |n) =
(
n
x
)
pxqn−x, F (·)
and f(·) being the standard normal distribution function and the standard normal density , respectively.
2. The standard normal approximation of the binomial distribution leads to the approximate formula
M̂(d˜) = σ
(
ρF (τ) + f√qpnf(τ)
)
, (2)
where
τ =
pn− [αn]− 0.5√
qpn
. (3)
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Proposition 1 follows from the lemmas on the “normal voting sample” [3]. It can be observed that p
and q are the probabilities of positivity and negativity for a single capital increment, respectively, while
f/σ is the density of a zero increment in a proposal.
A normal approximation for the binomial distribution is recommended when qpn ≥ 9. For a fixed
qpn, its accuracy is maximal for p = 0.5 and decreases when p approaches 0 or 1. That is why for
0.1 < p < 0.9, the normal approximation is frequently adopted whenever qpn > 5. For p very close to 0
or 1, sometimes qpn > 25 is required.
The dependence of the one-step mean capital increment M(d˜) of an agent on the adjusted mean of
the environment ρ for 21 participants and α = 0.5 is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. One-step mean capital increment of an agent: 21 agents; α = 0.5.
Figure 1 shows that for ρ ∈ (−0.9,−0.266), the mean capital increment is an appreciable negative
value, i.e., proposals approved by the majority are, on average, unprofitable (and “confiscatory”) for the
society. The corresponding part of the curve will be called the “pit of losses.” For ρ < −0.9, the negative
M(d˜) is very close to zero, since the proposals are extremely rarely accepted.
The phenomenon of “pit of losses” has much in common with the results of A.V. Malishevsky (described
in [10, Chapter 2, Section 1.3]), who was the first to demonstrate (in 1969) that the eventual outcome of
a series of egoists’ votes can be extremely unprofitable for all of them. It also evokes association with
the aphorism of Kozma Prutkov2, “An egoist is like someone sitting in a well since long ago,” used as an
epigraph to this paper.
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that, due to the negativity of ρ, positive increments
proposed by the environment have, on average, smaller absolute values than negative ones. As a result,
the total loss of the losing minority systematically exceeds the total income of the winning majority.
Hence, despite the desire of all agents to increase their capital and majority approval of all the decisions,
social welfare reduces. Thus, in a moderately unfavorable environment, decisions taken by a simple
majority of egoists reduce their total capital!
How does the mean capital increment depend on the number of agents? This dependence is shown in
Fig. 2. With an increase of n, the minimum point moves to the right and the “pit of losses” becomes
narrower. The depth of the “pit” increases at first, reaches a maximum at n = 7, and then tends to zero
monotonically with further increase of n. Let us note that for small n’s, the approximation of (2) has
insufficient accuracy and does not reflect the initial tendency of the “pit” to deepen with the growth of n.
For n = 31, its accuracy (see the dashed line in Fig. 2) becomes acceptable.
2 Gibian, G., editor, The Portable Nineteenth-century Russian Reader, New York: Penguin Books, 1993.
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Fig. 2. One-step mean capital increment of an agent for odd n’s and α = 0.5.
Thus, the effect of capital reduction caused by majority decisions gradually weakens with the growth
of n. For even n’s the “pit” is shallower than for the neighboring odd numbers of agents, since the de
facto majority threshold is higher in the latter case: to accept a proposal, an overbalance in at least two
votes is necessary.
It can be observed that the shape of the M(d˜) curves is similar for different odd n’s. Moreover, if we
denote the dependence of M(d˜) on ρ for n agents and a fixed σ by ϕn(ρ), then with n and n
′ exceeding
20 we have a quite accurate approximate relationship:
ϕn′(ρ) ≈
√
n
n′ ϕn
(
ρ
√
n′
n
)
. (4)
Thus, a k2-fold decrease in n leads to a k-fold stretching of the curve along both axes. A matching
of the curves based on (4) is illustrated by Fig. 3, where the functions
√
nϕn
(
ρ /
√
n
)
with various n are
depicted. If n and n′ are greater than 30, then the accuracy of (4) is quite high.
Fig. 3. Matching curves of Fig. 2 by means of correspondence (4).
It follows from (2) and (4) that a k2-fold increase in the number of participants has a similar effect
as a k-fold decrease in σ. Hence, an increase in variance “balances” the same increase in the number of
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voters: the graph of the dependence of M(d˜) on ρ remains almost unchanged under these simultaneous
transformations.
Finally, observe that for an odd n, α = 0.5, and ρ = 0 (neutral environment), (2) and (3) yield a very
simple formula:
M̂(d˜) =
σ
pi
√
n
. (5)
On the other hand, such a result of averaging with rejection within a probabilistic model looks quite
natural.
3. DEPENDENCE OF THE CAPITAL DYNAMICS ON THE MAJORITY THRESHOLD
As one could guess, the “pit of losses” becomes narrower and shallower with an increase in the majority
threshold α: the mean capital increment of an agent falls less in the negative area (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. One-step mean capital increment of an agent for various acceptance thresholds α (n = 21, σ = 10).
At the same time, looking to the right we notice that the higher α is, the slower the agent’s capital
grows with an increase of µ. The society can insure itself against loss under a moderately negative µ by
choosing a high enough α, however, this reduces the benefit of a large µ when the environment becomes
favorable.
Fig. 4 (where approximation (2) is used) contains, among others, the curve for α = 0.45. It has
a relatively wide and deep “pit of losses,” however, it grows faster than the curves with α > 0.45 as
µ increases. Thereby it surpasses the curves corresponding to α ≥ 0.5 in the domain of positive µ
(cf. Fig. 5,a). This means that in a favorable environment, it is rational to “take risks” of accepting
proposals that are only supported by a sufficiently large minority. Despite the fact that these can be
disadvantageous for the majority, the benefit of the supporting minority will systematically exceed the
loss of the majority. After a sufficient number of steps, this will lead to profits for all, since the agents’
capital increments are mutually independent.
4. OPTIMUM ACCEPTANCE THRESHOLD IN A SOCIETY OF EGOISTS
The above analysis shows that for any n, σ, and the environment favorability µ, there is a kind of
optimum3 acceptance threshold α. It is α that maximizes the average capital increment of the society.
3 On other approaches to optimizing the majority threshold see [6, 11] and [8, 12] for the case of multiple voting.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. The spline that maximizes the increment of capital w.r.t. α (a) and the average capital increment of an agent
in voting with the optimal acceptance thresholds (b); n = 21, σ = 10.
The optimal α can be found graphically. For each µ0, among all different curves of M(d˜) versus µ
corresponding to various α (like those in Fig. 4) find the one having the largest ordinate at abscissa µ0.
This curve matches optimal α’s for µ0. Now we can construct the curve of M(d˜) versus µ for which an
optimal α is taken at each µ. It is the spline of the “leading” fragments of the curves such as those
shown in Fig. 4 (see Fig. 5). Note that it is not the upper envelope4 of the set of curves, since only n+ 2
essentially different voting thresholds α are possible for each n: {− 1n , 0, 1n , 2n , . . . , 1} (the first and the last
values correspond to the acceptance and rejection of all proposals, respectively). The constructed curve
provides the maximum (w.r.t. α) possible mean increment of agent’s capital for each µ.
It is easy to see (Fig. 5,b) that voting with optimal acceptance thresholds is devoid of “pits of losses”
and always yields positive expected capital increments.
An expression for the optimal acceptance threshold will be obtained in Section 5. Now observe that its
dependence on µ is a “ladder” with steps of equal height due to the aforementioned finiteness of the set
of essentially different thresholds. If α is an optimal threshold and [α1n] = [αn], then α1 is also optimal.
Fig. 6 presents the graph of the mean values of the equivalence classes of optimal acceptance thresholds
as a function of ρ ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] for n = 21; vertical lines are added for clarity.
If α¯0 is the mean value of the equivalence class of optimal thresholds for fixed n, σ, and µ, then this
class is the half-interval [α¯0− 12n , α¯0+ 12n [. Outside the segment ρ ∈ [−0.7, 0.7], if the acceptance threshold
α is close to the optimal one and the number of agents is appreciable, then proposals are almost always
accepted (to the right of the segment) or hardly ever accepted (to the left of the segment) (cf. Fig. 5,b).
Therefore, the issue of determining the exact optimal threshold loses its practical value in this case.
Finding the optimal acceptance threshold α0 in real-world situations looks like a solvable problem. To
estimate α0, it is sufficient to estimate ρ = µ/σ on the basis of statistics and to have reason to believe that
the ViSE model is relevant for the situation under consideration at least approximately. However, even
if the estimation of ρ and the question of ViSE model adequacy cause difficulties, the general conclusion
that the increase of the acceptance threshold is reasonable when the environment becomes less favorable,
seems to remain true. This conclusion is based on the fundamental fact that a total loss of a minority
in an unfavorable environment can systematically exceed the total income of the majority supporting a
proposal. This fact determines a common flaw of standard voting procedures: the votes are taken into
account irrespective of the importance of the considered issue for each voter; the total loss/profit caused
by a proposal is ignored.
4 An envelope touches all curves in an infinite set.
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Fig. 6. Mean values of the equivalence classes of optimal acceptance thresholds α0 (a “ladder”) for n = 21 along with
the approximation (6) of the optimal acceptance threshold (the gray line).
Now we turn to derive an approximate expression for the optimal acceptance threshold in a society
consisting of homines economici.
5. EXPRESSIONS FOR THE OPTIMAL ACCEPTANCE THRESHOLD
The following theorem gives an approximation of the optimal voting threshold α0.
Theorem 1. Let α0 be the acceptance threshold that maximizes the expected one-step capital increment
in the society of egoists. Then the standard normal approximation of the binomial distribution leads to:
– the estimate
αˆ0 = p
(
1− qρ
f
)
; (6)
– the expression
M̂(d˜0) = µF
(
µ
ν
)
+ νf
(
µ
ν
)
(7)
for the corresponding maximum expected capital increment , where ν = σf/
√
qpn and the remaining
notations are given in Section 1 and Proposition 1.
The proofs are given in the Appendix.
Note that threshold (6) is solely determined by the environment parameters and does not depend on n.
Since p, q, and f are functions of ρ, the only parameter that determines αˆ0 is ρ. The detailed formula is:
αˆ0 = F (ρ)
(
1− ρF (−ρ)
f(ρ)
)
.
The “ladder” dependence shown in Fig. 6 can be obtained from (6) by applying transformation
α¯0 =
[αˆ0n] + 0.5
n
. (8)
Theorem 1 provides extremely simple analytical approximations for the optimal threshold and the
corresponding expected capital increment of an agent. For comparison, the problem of finding the
abscissas and ordinates of the functions M(d˜) minima (shown in Figures 2 and 4) and the points of their
intersection with the horizontal axis does not lead to simple analytical expressions.
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6. RATE OF CHANGE OF THE OPTIMAL VOTING THRESHOLD AS A FUNCTION OF ρ
The dependence of αˆ0 on ρ in Fig. 6 looks linear, however, linearity is inevitably violated on a wider
range of arguments due to the finiteness of α and the infiniteness of ρ (Fig. 7).
To find the slope of the curve αˆ0(ρ) at zero, we differentiate the function (6) with respect to ρ.
Proposition 2.
dαˆ0(ρ)
dρ
=
(f + pρ)(f − qρ)− qp
f
. (9)
The function dαˆ0(ρ)/dρ is negative; its absolute value is shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Approximation αˆ0 of the optimal acceptance threshold and the derivative of the expression (6) taken with
minus. The latter interpreted as a distribution density has “relatively heavy tails,” which is noticeable when comparing
it with the normal density indicated by a dotted line.
In the case of neutral environment (ρ = 0), we have p = q = 1/2 and f = 1/
√
2pi. Substituting these
into (9) yields
Corollary 1.
dαˆ0(ρ)
dρ
∣∣∣
ρ=0
=
1
2
(√
2
pi
−
√
pi
2
)
≈ −0.2277.
This derivative at zero does not depend on either the number of agents or the other parameters of the
model. We have: if µ decreases from 0 to −σ2 (i.e., ρ changed from 0 to −12) due, say, to an economic crisis,
then the optimal majority threshold increases from 50% to 61%. If µ decreases to −σ, then αˆ0 ≈ 71%.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained and interpreted several relationships that describe voting with an
optimal (i.e., maximizing the total capital of the society) majority threshold in the assumptions of the
ViSE model. These relationships led us to the conclusion that the acceptance threshold should be
increased if the environment generating proposals is becoming less favorable and should be decreased
in the opposite nonstable case. The optimal acceptance threshold has been estimated by means of a
function of the environment parameters, which does not depend on the number of participants. The
corresponding maximum expected capital increment has been specified.
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We have also obtained analytical expressions for the “pit of losses”, i.e., the graph of the function
representing the rate of decrease of egoists’ capital/utility caused by their democratic decisions in a
moderately unfavorable environment.
The derivative at zero of the estimated optimal acceptance threshold with respect to the environment
favorability is a constant
(√
2/pi − √pi/2)/2. The results of this paper allow interpretation in terms
of making real-world collective decisions in the environment whose favorability and variability can be
empirically assessed.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. To find the argument of the maximum value of the capital increment by
differentiation, we replace [αn] + 0.5 by αn in the expression (3) (cf. (8)). With this substitution, we
obtain a differentiable function that intersects the original one at points
{
k+0.5
n | k = 0, . . . , n
}
. Now
instead of (3), we have
τ = (p− α)
√
n
qp
. (A.1)
Differentiating expression (2) with respect to α and substituting (A.1) (the result of substitution is
denoted by M̂(α, τ, σ)), we find:
dM̂(α, τ, σ)
dα
= µf(τ)
dτ
dα
+
σf√
qpn
f(τ)τ
d(−τ)
dα
. (A.2)
The first-order condition for the maximum (the first derivative being zero) is reduced to
− ρ = (α− p)f
qp
. (A.3)
Taking into account the negativity of the second derivative, we obtain (6).
The second assertion of the theorem is proved by substituting the approximation (6) of the optimal
acceptance threshold into (2). Theorem 1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking into account that dp/dρ = −dq/dρ = f and df/dρ = −ρf
(
since
f = 1√
2pi
e−ρ2/2
)
, we obtain
dαˆ0(ρ)
dρ
=
d
dρ
p
(
1− qρ
f
)
= f
(
1− qρ
f
)
+ p
(
−(−f)ρf + qf + ρfqρ
f2
)
=
(f + pρ)(f − qρ)− qp
f
.
Proposition 2 is proved.
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